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WHAT DID PORTLAND'S EAST SIDE MAX LINE CHANGE ? :

TRIP BEHAVIOR AFTER LIGHT RAIL, A PRELIMINARY REPORT

Michael J. (Myles) Cunneen)

November 15, 1995

WHAT DID PORTLAND'S EAST SIDE MAX LINE CHANGE ? :

TRIP BEHAVIOR AFTER LIGHT RAIL, SUMMARY

Daily traffic on the Banfield Freeway near I-5 has grown from 117,900 vehicles in 1986, when MAX began, to 157,100 vehicles by 1993, a gain of 39,200 more vehicles (or about 50,960 people) a day. This increase is double the entire MAX daily ridership. For every person traveling on MAX there are over eight people traveling alongside it on I-84 daily.

The transit share of work trips in the MAX Corridor actually declined from 11.2% in 1980 to 8.6% in 1990, according to U.S. Census Journey-to-Work data. The MAX line opened in 1986. Census data also shows that use of autos in the MAX Corridor for work trips increased from 80.9% in 1980 to 83.3% in 1990. Transit use for work trips even declined in Census Tracts where MAX is within walking distance of most people. This decline was in spite of an increase in the proportion of trips made to Downtown from the MAX Corridor from 11% in 1980 to 16% in 1990.

The decline in transit market share which occurred on the MAX Corridor was virtually identical to the transit decline in the Seattle metropolitan area and paralled declines throughout the metropolitan region and the nation. It was worse than the decline which occurred in bus-only North Portland and in two metropolitan areas which added no new rail lines in the 1980's: New York and San Francisco. <

The claim that MAX increased transit ridership in the MAX Corridor by 50% has no statistical basis; it is a misinterpretation of data, itself flawed, pertaining to only part of the Corridor. The corollary claim that two-thirds of MAX's ridership diverted from busses, one-third from autos is also false. Census data confirm that no net increase in the share of transit ridership occurred. Nearly all MAX riders may have been bus riders if MAX had not existed.

Tri-Met surveys have shown that as little as 60% of daily MAX riders actually cross the Willamette River while 6-8% of daily MAX riders are only making trips within Downtown Portland. Over 40% of weekday MAX trips are made by "transit dependent" riders without access to an auto.

The low speed of MAX, combined with the greater time spent in getting to and from MAX compared to bus, have resulted in little travel time advantage for transit riders from pre-MAX days. While the Gresham to Downtown Portland MAX had been thought to take only 35 minutes in early planning stages, the actual time was 45 minutes in 1986 and is now scheduled to take 49 minutes. The MAX line began with too many stations yet more have been added. This, plus some operating procedures, have added to travel time. MAX operating speeds declined from 15.5 MPH in 1987 to 14.9 MPH in 1992. The scheduled travel time for MAX from Gateway is slightly longer now than that of the old #91 Flyer express bus service it replaced or the existing C-TRAN #75 express bus.

Portland's priority to raise MAX ridership may have been at the expense of ridership gains on several radial bus routes.

WHAT DID PORTLAND'S EAST SIDE MAX LINE CHANGE ? :

TRIP BEHAVIOR AFTER LIGHT RAIL, A PRELIMINARY REPORT

Introduction

This report summarizes available information about changes in trip behavior on the East Side of Multnomah County, Oregon in the years after the 1986 opening of the MAX (Metropolitan Area Express) light rail line. It draws upon reports prepared for the Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon (Tri-Met) and the Metropolitan Service District (Metro), the regional planning organization. In addition to information supplied by these two agencies, considerable use is made of the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census Journey-to-Work data.

The 15-mile MAX line runs from the suburb of Gresham to Downtown Portland. For its first eight miles running west from its Gresham terminal, MAX operates mostly within an arterial street median subject to traffic signal control. For its next four miles, between the large Gateway Transit Center near I-205 and Lloyd Center, it operates alongside the I-84 Banfield Freeway. From Lloyd Center to the Willamette River it runs on another street, then crosses over the river on the Steel Bridge onto the streets of Downtown Portland. This last part of its inbound trip, between Lloyd Center and its Downtown terminal near 11th Avenue, runs for about three miles, entirely on surface streets. MAX has thirty station stops, two more than when it began. Eleven of these are in Downtown Portland, four in the Lloyd District, and fifteen in the area east of 39th Avenue, an area largely residential and suburban in character.

A substantial network of local busses connect passengers to MAX stations; a few MAX stations in East County (east of I-205) have park-and-ride lots. About 16% of Tri-Met's daily rides are on MAX, 84% on busses. As of 1993, MAX was carrying roughly 24,000 one-way rides on weekdays. Assuming everyone who rides MAX goes on it both ways, this would represent 12,000 actual riders. As of 1993, about 2,500 one-way rides occur during the weekday peak hour. MAX Saturday ridership is frequently even higher and has exceeded 35,000 daily one-way rides.

Traffic Levels on Banfield Freeway

One thing MAX did not do was to halt traffic growth on the Banfield Freeway. As of 1993, MAX daily weekday ridership was up to about 24,000. Yet double this number of people (50,960) had been added on weekdays to the Banfield Freeway in the same period. During the weekday peak hour about 3,900 more people had been added to the Banfield Freeway, nearly 62% more than the total peak hour ridership on MAX (2,400). In the peak hour, the high point of freeway congestion, there were nearly six people traveling on the Banfield Freeway for every one traveling alongside it on MAX.

Average daily traffic on the Banfield Freeway (I-84) approaching Downtown Portland is measured by the Oregon Department of Transportation at a permanent counter site near the Holladay Street ramp. As of 1982, average daily traffic on the Banfield Freeway was 103,300. In 1986, when MAX began, average daily traffic at the same site had grown to 117,900. A year later, it had grown to 130,500. From 1986 to 1993, average daily traffic on the Banfield Freeway grew from 117,900 to 157,100, a 33% increase. This represents a gain of 39,200 more vehicles a day or about 50,960 people a day (assuming 1.3 people per vehicle) on the Banfield Freeway since MAX began. Peak hour traffic grew from 10,000 to 13,000, a 30% increase. This represents a gain of roughly 3,000 more vehicles -- or roughly 3,900 more people -- in the peak hour on the Banfield Freeway since MAX began.

Tri-Met Ridership Changes

The most oft-quoted claim made by government agencies and the local news media in Portland concerning light rail is that MAX had the effect of increasing total transit ridership in "the Banfield corridor" by 50%. This statistic sounds like every two East County bus riders before MAX were joined by a third former auto commuter who switched to MAX. Therefore, this "50% increase" figure has been the basis for a corollary claim: that two-thirds of MAX's ridership diverted from busses, one-third from autos. In countless newspaper articles, television news stories, and public statements these claims are repeated, even by light rail opponents. The two-thirds claim has been incorporated into position papers and research data by local government agencies to such an extent that its veracity goes unchallenged.

The origin of this "50% increase" figure seems to have been a statistic put out by Tri-Met showing that the total number of transit trips increased in "The Outer East" (east of I-205) portion of Multnomah County by 46% between Spring 1985 and Spring 1988. This 46% increase, blown upwards to 50%, has been cited by some as the impact MAX has had on transit ridership. (1)

The trouble is that this "50% increase" (or "46% increase") figure does not mean what people have interpreted it to mean. The 46% East County increase does not mean that MAX increased total transit ridership in the MAX Corridor. It also certainly does not mean that one-third of MAX's ridership diverted from autos. The increase that occurred in East County Tri-Met ridership is misleading for the following reasons.

First, it fails to take into account transit ridership changes west of I-205 in the MAX Corridor. Yet the West MAX Corridor (Metro's "Inner East") contains roughly half of all the transit trips within the entire MAX Corridor. Tri-Met slightly reduced bus service through the West MAX Corridor in 1986 and transit ridership there slightly decreased.

Second, it ignores the reality that some of this increase reflects "induced trips" by people who simply made trips they had not previously been making because suddenly much more transit service became available. The increase came after a fantastic expansion of East County transit service. Not only was the MAX line installed but so were an entire collection of new East County feeder bus routes (detailed in Appendix A). This put a much larger proportion of the East County population within walking distance of transit service.

Third, some of the people drawn to MAX have been from outside the boundaries of what was defined as "East County" in 1986. Some have come from Hood River County or eastern Clackamas County (via the #84 Sandy\Boring bus or by auto to park-and-ride lots). Some have certainly been drawn from Clark County. Bus service from Clark County to MAX at Gateway has developed while other Clark County commuters drive to MAX. As of August 1995, 23% of the license plates at the Gateway Transit Center, the biggest MAX parking lot, were Washington State plates. Prior to MAX, people from these outlying areas would not have had such access to any form of radial transit from eastern Multnomah County. From 1986 on, they did, and were exposed to lavish advertising by Tri-Met encouraging everyone to take MAX. (2)

Fourth, some of this increase was due to a population increase, not any modal diversion. More trips on mass transit occurred in the MAX Corridor east of I-205 in large part because more trips were being made in general.

Fifth, the increase in transit trips from "The Outer East" was mainly in non-work trips. These generally occur outside of the peak hours. What increase there was in work trips was to places other than Downtown Portland. These increased 320%. But this was an increase from a small base (450) and to destinations less critical from a traffic viewpoint than Downtown. (3)

The critical trips that MAX was targeted to reduce were those to Downtown Portland in peak hours. These are the trips that have the greatest impact on traffic congestion and air pollution. What proportion of these were made via transit before and after MAX is not so easy to determine. The closest surrogate statistic is given by Metro in terms of work trips by transit to Downtown. This data indicates that the proportion of work trips by transit made from "The Outer East" to Downtown Portland remained the same (38.0%) a few years after MAX as it had been before MAX. (4)

More evidence that MAX was not having that much impact in reducing auto trips to Downtown Portland comes from Tri-Met data showing that as of 1989 only 10,500 of MAX's then 18,250 riders were actually crossing the Willamette River for any purpose. (Later surveys have shown an increase in this cross-river proportion.) Also, 1,450 MAX riders (8% of the total) represented only short (and free) trips within Downtown Portland's "Fareless Square". A June 1987 survey of 7,040 weekday MAX riders found that 6.4% were trips made within Downtown. Tri-Met data shows that about 44% of weekday MAX trips are made by "transit dependent" riders: those without access to an auto. This category also accounts for 55% of Saturday MAX trips. (5) (6) (7)

Transit ridership decreased in the West MAX Corridor (Metro's "Inner East") between Spring 1985 and Spring 1988. Total Inner East transit trips decreased 25%. The number of transit work trips declined 19%. As a proportion of the total work trips, transit work trips declined even more, by 25%. Transit work trips as a proportion of all work trips fell from 15.2% to 11.3% in the Inner East (west of I-205), a decline mirrored by Census data. All transit trips as a proportion of all trips fell from 9.5% to 6.9% in the Inner East during the same period. (8)

Transit did gain market share in the Outer East (east of I-205). Transit work trips as a proportion of all work trips rose in the Outer East from 6.7% to 8.2% while all transit trips as a proportion of all trips also rose there from 3.0% to 5.1%. However, the losses to transit in "The Inner East" resulted in total East Side transit ridership rising only 6% in year MAX began (Spring 1986 to Spring 1987). With a subsequent fare increase, Tri-Met total East Side ridership actually declined slightly from Spring 1985 to Spring 1988. This suggests that MAX had a negligible impact on overall transit ridership. (9)

Trip Mode Changes According to Census Data

The trouble with Tri-Met data is that it deals with little outside of the tiny minority of trips made in the Portland area on mass transit. Moreover, their data is generally given on a daily basis, not by peak hour, and is stated in numbers of trips, not in proportion of trips. The number of trips on MAX, on Tri-Met in general, has been increasing. However, this may not mean so much because everything has been increasing in the Portland area -- trips of all types, population, number of autos, employment, and developed area. What is needed to understand what changes have occurred is a comprehensive look at the whole picture with changes in market share by mode analyzed.

Perhaps the best comprehensive look at the effect the East Side MAX line has had on the Banfield Corridor may be provided by data collected every ten years by the Census. The U.S. Census Bureau surveyed work trips for both 1980 and 1990. As the East Side MAX was built in 1986, this provides a good "before" and "after" comparison.

The Census Journey-to-Work data is not perfect. It consists of answers to questions about where people worked and which mode they used to travel to work most often the week before. It is certainly not accurate on a census tract level, contains obvious errors, and is generally misleading when it comes to pinning down exact mode of travel to many locations. Many people claim "Walk" as their mode to Downtown while it is clear many of these traveled on some transit vehicle or in autos before they began their walking Downtown. As the opinion of "most often" is asked and only the opinion of the subject is taken, there is a tendency for people to give answers which are more socially acceptable. The Census data clearly exaggerates use of non-auto modes to work sites outside of Downtown. The number of people claiming to use mass transit to suburban work locations exceeds the number we can account for by detailed studies at specific work sites. Many people claim to take mass transit or to bicycle to work and don't readily admit that in reality this is done so only sometimes.

However, these inaccuracies are not likely much greater or lesser from one Census to another and the Census sample size is huge -- 12-15% of the household population -- the largest survey of transportation in the region. Therefore, the comparative differences between the 1980 and 1990 Census results, if taken on a large enough geographical basis, accurately reflect real changes in commuting patterns.

To see what differences occurred between 1980 and 1990, a select group of Census Tracts corresponding to the service area of the MAX line was examined. These Census Tracts are generally within a mile of either a MAX station, bus routes feeding MAX, or radial bus routes nearby to MAX. Appendix B gives the exact geographic composition of what is described here as the MAX Corridor and its sub-divisions with specific Multnomah County Census Tracts cited. Appendix C gives the number and percentage of work trips from Census data in spreadsheet form.

Table 1 shows the Census Journey-to-Work data for 1980 in the MAX Corridor by the proportion of trips made by modal category. Table 2 shows the results for 1990. This Census data shows that use of mass transit by residents of the MAX Corridor for work trips actually dropped from 11.2% in 1980 to 8.6% in 1990 as a percentage of all work trips. This substantial decline in transit market share occurred in both the East MAX Corridor (east of 82nd Avenue) and in the West MAX Corridor (west of 82nd Avenue). In the East MAX Corridor, use of mass transit by residents for work trips declined from 8.2% in 1980 to 5.8% in 1990. In the West MAX Corridor, use of mass transit by residents for work trips declined from 17.3% in 1980 to 14.4% in 1990. (10) (11)

In contrast, use of autos by residents of the MAX Corridor for work trips increased from 80.9% in 1980 to 83.3% in 1990. This increase in auto market share also occurred in both the East MAX Corridor and in the West MAX Corridor. Even the proportion of work trips made by people who live in Downtown Portland by transit declined -- from 22.3% in 1980 to 18.8% in 1990.

A further check on any MAX-related modal shift is provided by examining the 1980 and 1990 data only in Census Tracts where MAX is within walking distance of most people. Here one might expect MAX to have made the greatest impact. These Census Tracts are collectively referred to as the "Near MAX Corridor". Tables 1 and 2 also show the results of this analysis. In the "Near MAX Corridor", use of transit by residents for work trips also declined -- from 11.2% in 1980 to 9.3% in 1990. There was a corresponding increase in auto market share in the Near MAX Corridor from 80.6% in 1980 to 82.7% in 1990. In the balance of Census Tracts within the MAX Corridor -- those located further from MAX stations (the "Outer MAX Corridor") -- transit use also declined.

This decline in transit use is in spite of an increase in the proportion of trips made to Downtown locations from eastern Multnomah County. Between 1980 and 1990 not just the number, but the proportion of East Side workers who worked Downtown increased, from 11.4% to 16.1% according to Census data. According to Metro's tabulation by "County Subareas", this increase occurred in the part of Multnomah County east of I-205 (County Subareas 4 and 5) which MAX was especially aimed at. In this "Outer East" area, the proportion who worked Downtown increased from 8.7% to 11.0%.

Table 3 compares the decline in transit market share within the MAX Corridor from 1980 to 1990 to what occurred in all of Multnomah County, Clackamas County, Washington County, the entire Portland metropolitan area, several other major metropolitan areas, and in the United States nationally. These include metropolitan areas which added light rail between 1980 and 1990 (Sacramento, San Diego, and Buffalo). The decline in transit market share which occurred on the MAX Corridor was virtually identical to the same decline in the Seattle metropolitan area, a region much chided by light rail supporters for failing to follow Portland's example in developing light rail. The decline in transit market share within the MAX Corridor was worse than that which occurred in two metropolitan areas which added no new rail lines in the 1980's: New York and San Francisco.

No solid, statistical data exists to support the claim that MAX has either increased the total proportion of trips made by mass transit or that MAX has diverted any appreciable number of peak period trips away from autos. The U. S. Census Journey-to-Work data, as well as Tri-Met household survey data for the entire MAX Corridor, suggest that MAX has had only a negligible impact towards increasing mass transit ridership. The U. S. Census Journey-to-Work data suggests that MAX has apparently failed to reverse a continuing downward trend in transit market share in eastern Multnomah County.

Auto Reduction Due to MAX

Tri-Met heavily advertized the claim prior to 1992 that MAX keeps 10,000 automobiles off the road. The 10,000/day number assumed that MAX's then 20,000 daily ridership represented two trips per day by commuters, all of whom would otherwise drive autos.

Considerable data, much of it from Tri-Met, exists to suggest that the real reduction of autos due to MAX is far less. First, Tri-Met surveys indicate that 44% of all weekday MAX riders are "transit dependent" and therefore could not switch to auto use. This alone cuts the 10,000/day number down to 5,600/day. Second, the auto occupancy for vehicular trips is generally about 1.3 persons per auto such that 5,600 person trips by auto would result in only 4,300 actual autos on the road. Third, Tri-Met and Census data indicate that most of these 4,300 auto trips would also not materialize on the road because the trip would be made instead by radial bus so a maximum of 4,300 auto trips can further reduced to a range of about 0-2,000 auto trips.

If one accepts Tri-Met's estimate that two-thirds of MAX riders were diverted from bus use and without MAX would presumably go back to taking the bus this 10,000 figure would be only 3,300. Divided further by the auto occupancy ratio of 1.3 persons per auto, this translates into only 2,540 actual Autos. However, the real figure would certainly be lower. For one the two-thirds-from-bus estimate is certainly too low. For another, lacking MAX many "induced" trips would never be made at all at all or else would go someplace else. In addition, it is clear that some pre-MAX bus riders switched to auto use after MAX because they lost pre-MAX bus routes which were more convenient or faster for them. These considerations also gauge the number of autos removed due to MAX in the range of only 0-2,000 auto trips.

The overall effect of MAX in peak period auto reduction was actually zero. The Census data suggests that MAX failed to reverse a trend in work trips away from transit in general, even to Downtown locations. Between 1980 and 1990, a higher proportion of people left the transit system than entered it. Further evidence for this is that the 23.2% decline in transit use for work trips which has occurred in the MAX Corridor is virtually the same as the 23.5% decline which occurred in the Seattle metropolis, which lacks any rail service. It was also similar to the 26.8% decline which occurred in Southeast Portland between 1980 and 1990 (from 12.6% to 10.6% of all work trips). In fact, there was less decline in transit's market share of work trips in North Portland, which has no light rail service. The North Portland decline was only 15.9% (from 12.6% to 10.6% of all trips). Comparing the market share changes between 1980 and 1990 in the MAX Corridor to other areas of Portland or to other metropolitan areas, it was as if the MAX line was never built: one cannot detect any difference.

In contrast, when the earlier Banfield Freeway HOV Lane was in operation, about 45% of the express bus riders on its "Banfield Flyer" routes said they had switched from autos, two-thirds of these from single-occupant autos. The real question perhaps should be how much MAX may have reduced auto trips compared to how well other likely alternatives -- express bus among them -- would have performed. Tri-Met does have data as to what proportion of MAX riders diverted from auto use. For instance, a 1987 survey of 9,200 MAX passengers asked the purpose of trip (e.g. work), destination, "How often do you ride MAX ?", and "How often did you use the bus before MAX ?". A cross-tabulation would show the percentage formerly using bus on a regular basis for work and other trips. (12) (13)

Another unanswered question is what MAX's impact has been on total Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT). It may have reduced the number of auto trips but it also created some. This is because of the much higher tendency for commuters to drive to rail (as opposed to bus) transit. It is also clear that some MAX riders drive long distances to use MAX. Tri-Met surveys indicate that 30% of MAX riders use auto-oriented park-and-ride access to reach MAX (23% use feeder busses). Only 38% of MAX riders walk to MAX while 68% of Tri-Met bus riders do. (14)

Travel Time and MAX

Early forecasts made for MAX before its inauguration assumed an inbound travel time from Gresham to Downtown Portland of only about 35 minutes. In actuality, this turned out to be 45 minutes in MAX's first few years of operation, and by 1994 was up to 49 minutes. With the MAX travel time roughly a quarter-hour more than originally anticipated, the typical door-to-door travel time of a transit commuter from home to work is roughly the same for light rail as it is for radial bus. Most people living west of I-205 live much nearer to a radial bus route, frequently within walking distance. Therefore, only a small minority of transit riders from the "Inner East" -- the area west of I-205 -- take MAX. East of I-205 in the "Outer East", there are few radial bus routes; most bus routes which exist here are feeder busses which take riders to a MAX station where they must transfer to reach Downtown. Most of the "Outer East" is, in effect, a MAX monopoly as far as transit service to Downtown is concerned.

In spite of objections from Tri-Met, C-TRAN has continued to operate an express bus route on the Banfield Freeway which competes with MAX. C-TRAN provides the only public transit service which uses the Banfield Freeway other than the privately-owned airport services. The route, originally the #76 Vancouver Mall Limited and since 1990 known as the #75 Evergreen Express, connects eastern Clark county with Downtown Portland via I-205 and I-84. Ridership on this route grew 54% between 1985 and 1990. In 1990, this route was split into two routes: one acting as an express feeder route to MAX at Gateway and one going all the way Downtown (after a stop at MAX). The combined ridership of the two routes in 1990 was 160% above 1985 levels. The two C-TRAN routes in the MAX Corridor are described below.

#75 Evergreen Express -- which runs from the Evergreen Transit Center (park-and-ride lot) on a short feeder route, then runs express down I-205 from Mill Plain Road to Downtown Portland via I-84 with one stop at the Gateway Transit Center (MAX transfer). It operates four peak hour trips with no off-peak or weekend service.

#76 Vancouver Mall Limited -- which runs from the Vancouver Mall park-and-ride lot express down I-205 from S.R. 500 to the Gateway Transit Center, where its riders can transfer to MAX or the #75 to continue on to Downtown Portland. It operates two peak hour trips with no off-peak or weekend service.

MAX does not live up to its name as a "Metropolitan Area Express". For only four of its fifteen miles, along the Banfield Freeway, does it operate with the sort of speed and wide station spacing appropriate for suburban commuter operation. Elsewhere it operates as a 1930's-style trolley. No where does it run on an elevated platform or in a subway tunnel; except for the Steel Bridge, its route is all at surface. Table 4 shows the comparative inbound morning travel times on radial transit routes to Downtown Portland. The low speed of MAX puts in a speed range somewhere between a local and an express bus. Nor does this table tell the whole story. The times shown are "line haul" times only: the time on board transit vehicles not including access or waiting time used by passengers in getting to radial transit. That time tends to be greater for rail than for bus passengers; light rail riders must first take a feeder bus or drive an auto to MAX or else walk a long distance.

Table 5 shows the inbound morning travel times on MAX and express bus routes from the Gateway Transit Center to Downtown Portland. Travel times are quite similar by bus or MAX. The #91 no longer exists but the #75 has grown substantially in ridership.

MAX is also slower than many other rail transit systems. Its 19.6 miles-per-hour scheduled operating speed is only about 70% as fast as the Bay Area Rapid Transit system in the San Francisco area or the Vancouver, British Columbia Sky Train. It is slower than many other light rail lines, including those in Cleveland, San Diego, Calgary, and some of the Boston lines. More disturbing, in relation to light rail's ability to compete with auto travel, is MAX's tendency to get progressively slower.

Why is MAX so slow ? The system probably began with too many stations yet more stations have been added. Only two stations were ever warranted in the Lloyd District and only two of the three original stations there have generated significant ridership. Yet Tri-Met added a fourth station in this area, midway between two of the original stations and only two-four short blocks from either. It added another station downtown. Both new stations serve government real estate developments (the Oregon Convention Center and Pioneer Place), the prevailing ideology of local government planners being to "build in" transit at central city developments. However, both developments were only a block and a half away from an original MAX station, a shorter distance than New York City's Convention Center in Midtown Manhattan is from the nearest subway station.

The slow speed is also due to some questionable operating procedures. MAX cars stop for as long as 60 seconds at some stations even when all passengers have gotten in and out within 20 seconds. MAX purposely moves at a snail's pace on surface streets within the Lloyd District and Downtown Portland, especially over the Steel Bridge, where busses always pass it. Actual MAX operating speed -- as opposed to scheduled operating speed -- as monitored by Tri-Met declined from 15.5 miles-per-hour in 1987 to 14.9 miles-per-hour in 1992. This slow speed is in spite of the traffic signal pre-emption that favors MAX -- and delays busses and major traffic arteries at several locations -- developed at a cost of several hundred thousands of dollars. As rail transit equipment ages, travel time gets slower and delays more frequent; MAX will likely experience this as well. (14) (15)

The 1986 reorientation of East county bus routes gave MAX a virtual captive market for transit service to Downtown Portland. Traveling Downtown by transit from Troutdale or Gresham, for instance, one has to take MAX. This "transit monopoly" status may be MAX's greatest asset because its low travel speed would otherwise render it vulnerable to competition from express bus services. The MAX travel time from Gateway, for instance, is slightly longer than that of the old #91 Flyer service or the existing C-TRAN #75 express bus.

Tri-Met and other public agencies in the Portland area have made high MAX ridership a top priority. Indeed, the relative "success" of MAX is nearly always stated in terms of some increase in total weekday ridership on MAX. Daily ridership in itself, however, may not be especially meaningful. One can achieve great increases in daily MAX ridership without taking anyone in the peak period away from autos. This can be done by generating more MAX trips by "transit captives" who already ride MAX. The proposed extension of the Downtown "Fare Free" zone into the Lloyd District is a good example of this. The MAX-induced increase in transit trips, according to Tri-Met data, largely consisted of this sort of increase -- more teenagers traveling to Downtown Portland, more transit trips made by East County transit riders because more convenient day-long transit service became available.

The daily ridership figure on MAX takes on even less meaning when one considers what gains to total transit ridership aren't being achieved because maximum MAX ridership, not maximum transit ridership, is the governmental objective. Several radial bus routes might achieve higher ridership were they made faster by eliminating stops at MAX stations or by running express for part of their route on the Banfield Freeway.

The #12 (formerly #14) Sandy Boulevard bus route is a case in point. Both frequency of service and travel time on this route have suffered because of MAX. Three minutes were added to this route's travel time by making it detour off Sandy Boulevard to access the Hollywood MAX station. Yet few #12 passengers transfer to MAX nor do any have to in order to reach Downtown Portland. Were the #12 not relegated to this feeder role, it would offer shorter travel time to most Downtown locations than MAX does from a large area of the East Side. Fewer peak hour trips are offered on the #12 than were a decade ago and passengers have suffered from frequent crowding as technical problems with the Hungarian articulated busses Tri-Met bought for this route have caused many to be replaced by smaller, standard-size busses. If the #12 were run to maximize its ridership, and not to add a few more passengers to MAX, it might attract many more riders.

Another bus route which may be losing out by trying to feed MAX has been C-TRAN's #75 express bus route. Few of its passengers take the opportunity to transfer to MAX at Gateway unless there is definite news of severe congestion on the Banfield Freeway. Yet the detour to MAX costs the #75 five minutes. Without the detour it might attract additional Clark County riders who now travel by auto. Such a change might increase MAX ridership as well, because typically more riders board the #75 at Gateway going inbound (instead of MAX) than transfer to MAX. Clark County residents who wish to take MAX can do so anyway by taking the #76 Vancouver Mall Limited route.

Other East County bus routes have such a case of the slows they are uncompetitive with auto trips. Some trips of these routes might be run express on I-205 and I-84. Take the #4 Division Street bus for example. This route begins in suburban Gresham, 13 miles away from Downtown Portland. Even the few "Limited" runs of the #4 still run all the way on Division Street, making thirteen stops between 122nd Avenue (the point where it becomes "Limited") and Downtown. The Limited's line haul travel time from 182nd Avenue to Downtown is under 16 miles per hour. The bus trip time is 41 minutes with probably another 10-15 minutes or more spent walking to or from the bus and waiting for it.

1. The Downtown Portland terminus for all bus routes shown is 5th Avenue at Stark Street; for MAX, Pioneer Square; for #20 West Burnside and 6th Avenue.

2. All speeds shown are calculated from scheduled time and expressed as miles-per-hour.

3. The mileage and number of stops shown are between the beginning of the route to the common Downtown Portland terminus except if otherwise indicated. For C-TRAN route #75 this does not include a few stops in Clark County before it runs express.

4. "Local" means subject to bus stops every few blocks.

5. #12 travel time is from the NE Sandy/97th Park & Ride.

Because of the "MAX First" policy, not a single Tri-Met bus run is operated for passenger use on either freeway. This is in contrast to most other cities of similar size where the value of express service to entice commuters away from autos is recognized.

1. The Downtown Portland terminus for all routes is 5th Avenue at Morrison Street (MAX Pioneer Place station).

2. All speeds shown are calculated from scheduled time and expressed as miles-per-hour. Time for the #91 Flyer (no longer in existence) would be the same from Gateway as the #76 as the routes are virtually identical.

3. The mileage and number of stops shown are between Gateway and the common Downtown Portland terminus.

Conclusions

The basic conclusion one can come to about Portland's MAX light rail line is that, at least in its first seven years, it has failed to halt the decline in mass transit use. More people may be using transit today on the East Side of Multnomah County since 1986 but far more are using autos to make work trips. The growth in auto trips has, so far, exceeded the growth in transit trips both in sheer volume and in the overall proportion of work trips made. Considering that transit tends to attract a far lower proportion of non-work trips, this is a pretty poor performance.

While the increase in trips on MAX itself may have slightly exceeded growth in auto work trips, even that is misleading. Some of this MAX ridership has been at the expense of actual or potential bus ridership. Express bus service has been largely shunned while some radial lines have been relegated to feeder services; they might attract more riders if they provided faster service bypassing MAX stations.

As Portland plans no increase in capacity for any of its radial freeway or arterial routes, traffic congestion is bound to grow far worse during peak periods. The real hope of the government agencies in the Portland area is that automobile congestion (i.e. travel time) will become so much worse that people will switch to light rail. This may well happen. However, there are several major problems with such a strategy. These are as follows:

1) Even with all light rail lines built, under construction, or planned (now at a total cost approaching $5 billion), only a tiny minority of the region's residents will be within walking distance of a light rail station; either people will have to accept the extra time involved in accessing and riding feeder busses or a massive increase in park-and-ride lots would be necessary to support ridership growth.

2) The Banfield light rail line already built, as well as those under construction or planned, are all in the 15-25 miles per hour speed category. Adding in the time required by potential riders to walk or ride busses to MAX stations, wait for MAX, and walk from MAX to their destination, the door-to-door travel time offered by the light rail system would equate to roughly 10-15 miles per hour for the majority of riders; traffic congestion would have get very bad indeed for this to be competitive with future auto travel times.

3) Rail lines, as they age get mechanically less reliable, resulting in delays. These add further to passenger travel time. Also, more time is spent in stations if many more people get on and off. The upshot of this is that increased highway delays can be counter-balanced to an extent by increased delays in the transit system, as has already happened on MAX between 1986 and 1994.

4) If both transit and auto trips to Downtown Portland become terribly time-consuming, people have another option: work outside the central city in the booming suburban ring around Portland, an area well served by highways.

Higher transit ridership would likely have happened on a greater scale were faster transit service provided. Existing (and planned) light rail service in Portland is simply too slow to compete successfully with the great majority of auto trips.

APPENDIX A : HOW MAX CHANGED THE TRANSIT SYSTEM

Tri-Met 1986 System Changes With MAX

When Tri-Met opened MAX in 1986, it drastically reduced direct bus service from East County to Downtown Portland, eliminating three entire routes and cutting service on three others. This service was replaced by MAX. To bring people to and from MAX, however, a large East County feeder bus system had to be created. This feeder bus system entailed many more routes, covering a much greater area, than had the direct bus service to Downtown it replaced. Therefore, a larger and more elaborate East County bus system was felt required to make MAX work.

At the inaugural of MAX in September 1986, the following specific changes were made by Tri-Met within what may now be called the MAX Corridor.

1) It began the MAX light rail line between Gresham and Downtown Portland with seven morning and eight afternoon peak hour trips.

2) It cut service on the #12 (formerly #14) Sandy Boulevard bus route (from eight to six morning and from six to five afternoon peak hour trips) and added three minutes to this route's schedule be making it detour off Sandy Boulevard to go the Hollywood MAX station.

3) It cut service on the #19 Glisan Street bus route (from nine to five morning and from eight to five afternoon peak hour trips).

4) It cut service on the #20 Burnside Street bus route (from seven to six morning and afternoon peak hour trips).

5) It increased morning service on the #15 (formerly #21) Mount Tabor bus route (from six to eight peak hour trips).

6) It eliminated the #91 MKC Flyer express bus route which ran on the Banfield Freeway (seven morning and seven afternoon peak hour trips).

7) It eliminated the #18 Troutdale semi-express bus route on Halsey Street (two morning and two afternoon peak hour trips).

8) It eliminated the #40 Halsey Street bus route (five morning and five afternoon peak hour trips).

9) It continued the #80 Gresham\Troutdale feeder bus route to the Gresham Transit Center but reduced its number of runs (from five to two morning and afternoon peak hour trips).

10) It effectively replaced the #18 Troutdale and #40 Halsey Street routes with nine new East County feeder bus routes. These nine routes joined MAX at either the Gateway Transit Center or the Gresham Transit Center. Another feeder bus route (#83) joined MAX at the Hollywood Transit Center. The ten feeder routes created in 1986 were as follows:

#22 Park Rose

#23 San Rafael

#24 Halsey Street

#25 Gresham\Glisan (Glisan\Rockwood)

#26 Stark Street

#27 Market\Main Street

#81 Rockwood\Gresham (Gresham\257th)

#82 Eastman\182nd Avenue

#83 Hollywood\47th Avenue

#84 Sandy\Boring

The MAX Feeder Bus Routes

These feeder routes have not done well. The routes were created to handle a much higher ridership than actually developed. Suburbanites are not that willing to take a local bus to MAX rather than drive their autos to a park-and-ride lot. As of 1994, the park-and-ride lots at East County MAX stations were nearly full while ridership on the feeder bus routes remains quite low.

Of the eleven MAX feeder routes either created or maintained in 1986 (ten new ones plus the pre-existent #80), seven have generally failed to achieve daily originating rides above 250 since then. A few have even failed to generate 100 riders a day. Tri-Met has since eliminated one of these routes (#82 Eastman\182nd Avenue) and has tried to drop others, failing to do so only under political pressure. Two routes -- the #81 Rockwood\Gresham and the #83 Hollywood\47th Avenue) -- have generally failed to draw 100 originating rides a day. By 1994, eight of the surviving ten feeder routes created were generating under 500 originating rides a day. In contrast, to the average Tri-Met radial (directly to and from Downtown) bus route was generating 2,800 per day.

Operating Costs of Feeder and Express Bus Routes

The fiscal performance of these MAX feeder bus routes has been pathetic. By the Spring of 1989, nine of these eleven routes had demonstrated a revenue-to-expense ratio of under .10 -- that is they were getting less than 10 cents of income for every dollar of expense. Two of these routes had actually failed to receive 4 cents of income for every dollar of expense (one of these was eliminated). Even the two most successful of these MAX feeder bus routes were demonstrating revenue-to-expense ratios in the .14-.16 range at a time when the overall bus system was achieving a ratio of .23 (23 cents of income for every dollar of expense) and main line radial routes were doing even better. (16)

Tri-Met has tried to cut its losses on these feeder routes. Total daily bus runs on these feeder routes have been cut 30% between September 1986 and September 1995. To further trim operating costs, Tri-Met has reduced the size of busses used on these services. It now uses its smallest size bus, the "LIFT" mini-bus, on the #23, 25, 27, 80, 81, 83, and 84 feeder routes.

Tri-Met and Metro have made the claim that light rail enjoys a lower operating cost per passenger than does the Tri-Met bus system and hence, greater investment in light rail can be an efficiency measure. Such an assertion is badly undercut when one considers the feeder bus routes. First, their poor fiscal performance tends to drag down the overall average of Tri-Met bus route performance. Many of Tri-Met's radial bus routes have revenue-to-cost ratios in close range of MAX. Second, MAX's own fiscal performance does not look so good in comparison when one adds up the cost of the entire "MAX system": that is, the MAX line plus all the feeder bus routes from which it draws ridership and may be considered integral to the light rail system. The fiscal performance of the MAX system looks even worse when one adds in the operating, maintenance, and insurance expenses of all the park-and-ride lots and transit stations necessary for MAX to collect passengers. The East Side radial bus routes, which act as their own feeder service, are not generally dependent on such installations.

The Tri-Met express bus route which used to operate on the Banfield Freeway had as good if not better fiscal performance. The old #91 MKC Flyer express bus route, which Tri-Met eliminated when it began MAX, had a revenue-to-expense ratio of .48 in Winter 1986. As of Fiscal Year 1992, MAX had a revenue-to-expense ratio of .36, having fallen from .47 in Fiscal Year 1988. (This ratio has risen back somewhat since 1992.) Tri-Met data shows that the subsidy per passenger ride on MAX has risen from 25 cents per ride in 1987 to 52 cents per ride in 1992 while its overall subsidy per passenger ride on busses has risen only slightly: from $1.29 cents per ride in 1987 to $1.42 cents per ride in 1992.

APPENDIX B : U.S. CENSUS JOURNEY-TO-WORK DATA

The MAX Corridor, as used in this analysis, consists of that part of Multnomah County east of the Willamette River constituting an approximation of the commuter service area of the MAX light rail line, its feeder bus routes, and paralleling radial bus routes.

The West MAX Corridor consists of an area of Portland bordered by I-405 on its northwest corner, by Fremont Street and Cully Boulevard on the north, by 82nd Avenue on the east, and bordered on the south by a line extending westward from 82nd Avenue along Thorburn Street, 62nd Avenue, Belmont Street, 43rd Avenue, Stark Street, 39th Avenue, and then westward along Hawthorne Boulevard to the Willamette River. The West MAX Corridor consists of the following 1990 Multnomah County Census Tracts: 11.01, 12.01, 13.01, 17.01, 18.01, 18.02, 19, 20, 21, 22.01, 22.02, 23.01, 23.02, 24.01, 24.02, 25.01, 25.02, 26, 27.01, 27.02, 28.01, 28.02, 29.01, 29.02, and 76.

Of the above, what is identified as the Inner West MAX Corridor -- just those Census Tracts where MAX is within walking distance of most people -- consists of the following six Multnomah County Census Tracts: 18.01, 23.02, 24.02, 26, 27.02, and 28.02.

The East MAX Corridor consists of an area of eastern Multnomah County bordered by 82nd Avenue to the west, by the Columbia River on the north, by the County line with Hood River County to the east, and bordered on the south by the County line with Clackamas County east of Foster Road and by Division Street west of 162nd Avenue and Foster Road. The East MAX Corridor consists of the following Census Tracts: 16.02, 17.02, 29.03, 77, 78, 79, 80.01, 80.02, 81, 82.01, 82.02, 92.01, 92.02, 93, 94, 95, 96.01, 96.02, 98.01, 98.02, 99.01, 99.02, 99.03, 100, 101, 102, 103.01, 103.02, 104.02, 104.04, 104.05, 104.06, 104.07, and 105.

Of the above, what is identified as the Inner East MAX Corridor -- where MAX is within walking distance of most people -- consists of the following ten Multnomah County Census Tracts: 17.02, 29.03, 81, 93, 96.01, 96.02, 98.01, 101, 104.05, and 104.06.

Downtown Portland consists of Multnomah County Census Tracts 51, 53, 54, 56, and 57. This area of Portland is bordered by 12th Avenue on the west, by the Willamette River to the north and east, and by the Ross Island Bridge, Barbur Boulevard, and I-405 on the south. Downtown Portland as defined by these Census Tracts slightly exceeds the geographic limits of Downtown Portland as defined elsewhere and includes part of the Northwest Industrial District and a small area just south of Downtown. <

FOOTNOTES

1) Metropolitan Service District (METRO), The Effect of MAX on the Banfield Corridor; A Light Rail Start, September 1994, page 3, Table 1. <

2) Survey by Author.

3) METRO, page 3, Table 1.

4) METRO, page 3, Table 1.

5) METRO, page 13.

6) Coast Consulting, Ridership Survey of the Banfield Light Rail System, July 1987, prepared for the Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon, page 4.

7) Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon (Tri-Met), MAX Light Rail Patronage Profile, March 1990, page 3.

8) METRO, page 7, Table 7 and page 30.

9) METRO, page 9, Table 9 ("Tri-Met Eastside Patronage - Quarterly Reports") and page 30.

10) U. S. Census Bureau, Census Tracts, Portland, OR-WA, 1980, PHC80-2-290 report, Table P-9.

11) Metropolitan Service District (METRO), Journey-To-Work Trends in the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Area, January 1995, Tables 8 and 10.

12) Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), Metropolitan Section, Banfield High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes, Appendices, March 1978, Appendix D, page 164, Table D-10 (FHWA-RD-78-60).

13) Coast Consulting, Ridership Survey of the Banfield Light Rail System, July 1987. <

14) Tri-Met, MAX Patronage Profile, March 1990, Table 5.

15) Thomas Parkinson, Transport Consulting, Ltd., Rail Transit Performance, May 1992, prepared for the Transportation Research Board's Light Rail Transit Conference.

16) Tri-Met summary, Bus and Rail Service and Ridership, for Fiscal Years 1887-1992, March 1993.

17) All operating cost data are from Tri-Met quarterly summaries.